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Shanghai: Modern Conveniences as
an Argument for Displacing
Residents
The case of Jianyeli, a pilot rejuvenation project
Valérie Laurans
1 Do the  Chinese  aspire  to  modern conveniences?  Such a  question,  which may seem
incongruous,  embodies  the  spirit  of  the  times  in  many  big  Chinese  cities,  and
particularly in Shanghai. At a time when the residential spaces of this megalopolis are
undergoing complete renewal, residents are being encouraged to buy their own homes.
While the authorities seek to make urban space profitable,  residents are rethinking
their conception of domestic comfort.  Between the ambitions of politicians and the
concerns  of  residents,  access  to  modern  conveniences,  while  being  their  common
aspiration, is the scene of a clash of ideals between the leaders and the led.
2 My initial research explored the huge discrepancy, at the turn of the century, between
the availability  of  a  tremendous amount of  new housing on the market  and actual
demand among the population of Shanghai1. The question of social change appeared
just beneath the surface. The Chinese regime, which is dependent on the continuation
of economic reforms,  is  now working on the construction of  a  legal  framework for
urban renewal.  Faced with the excesses  of  property development,  what  recourse is
there for the citizens of Shanghai? This article considers the stakes involved in the
housing sector’s move into the market economy. It presents the social consequences of
the reorganisation of the housing stock in Shanghai and emphasises the fundamental
role that the displacement of the population has in the race for urban development. A
detailed study of Jianyeli, a historic area which is the object of a pilot urban renewal
project, recounts the progress of negotiations begun only after eviction proceedings
had begun.
The modern convenience paradigm or the metamorphoses of access to housing
3 In 2000, while the state was completing the dismantling of the fuli fen fang, i.e. the
allocation  of  housing  within  the  framework  of  the  welfare  system,  four-fifths  of
Shanghai: Modern Conveniences as an Argument for Displacing Residents
China Perspectives, 58 | march - april 2005
1
metropolitan residents did not wish to invest in the purchase of new housing. As far as
the authorities were concerned, the drop in the quality of housing conditions justified
changing the rules of access to domestic space: it was a question of shifting from the
principle of merit to the logic of the market. For residents, the very status of housing
was thus profoundly altered.
4 A rare commodity, housing, until the 1990s, was parsimoniously allocated by the state.
A resident had no leeway in deciding his place of residence, nor was he recognised as
master in his own house. He could at best only enjoy the use of collective property. One
of the major consequences of the privatisation of the residential property sector was to
give back to housing its status as inalienable property. By a ricochet effect, the relation
between the dwelling and its occupants was also profoundly altered. The resident, once
passive,  suddenly  became  once  more  the  active  agent  in  his  own  life.  If  they  had
sufficient financial means, the marketing of new housing offered all urban residents
the opportunity of anchoring their security in the place of their choice, as well as of
making their investment yield a profit. While access to housing was associated with a
financial investment, modern conveniences, a privilege to be earned, were associated
with  ownership.  What  would  be  the  social  consequences  of  the  marketing  of  new
dwellings?  Would  domestic  space  become  the  centre  of  new  demands  by  the
inhabitants? Would these demands close themselves into the private sphere, or, on the
contrary,  would  they  contribute  to  the  appearance  of  a  public  space  based  on  the
assertion of common interests?
 
1. Buildings in Jianyeli before renovation
5 Several  research  projects  are  currently  examining  these  questions2.  In  the  field  of
urban studies,  Chen Yingfang is taking up the concepts of “the city” and of “urban
society”  formulated  by  Max Weber  in  order  to  examine  the  effective  status  of  the
contemporary Chinese urban dweller.  The gap which exists  today between “passive
residents” and “citizens participating in the life of the city” raises the question of the
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building of social cohesion3. The emergence of civil society in Shanghai is also central
to Bao Yaming's  preoccupations.  His  research transposes Henri  Lefebvre's  theses of
“the right to the city” and of “the production of space” to the context of Shanghai, and
focuses on the changes in public space4. Similarly, academics working on “residential
communities”  (shiqu)5 and  on  “residents'  associations”  (jumin  xuehui) 6 envisage
residential space as the place of expression of social conflict and of the power relations
between the government and society. Benjamin L. Read7 ponders the representativity
and the influence of the elections of co-ownership committees (yuezhu weiyuanhui) in
Canton,  Chongqing and Peking.  In  his  view,  their  formation,  which is  more or  less
organised  by  the  state,  is  evidence  of  urban  residents'  desire  to  participate  at  the
lowest level of public life. These organisations may contribute to the formation of a
social connection based on the defence of property-owners' rights. Zhu Jiangang8, who
studies  the  disputes  relating  to  the  non-fulfilment  of  sales  or  housing  upkeep
agreements,  is  more cautious.  To an increasing extent,  only a small  fraction of  the
population is  concerned:  those  urban dwellers  who have the means to  become the
owners of new housing. Moreover, where Shanghai is concerned, this research does not
take  account  of  the  displacement  of  the  population,  a  phenomenon  which  is
characteristic of urban renewal, and which concerns the majority of urban dwellers
who were originally settled in the city centre.
From the reorganisation of the housing stock to the social reconfiguration of the
metropolis
6 At the turn of the twenty-first century, the Chinese state undertook the conversion of
the  housing sector  to  the  market  economy.  Shanghai,  confronted with an endemic
housing  shortage,  adopted  a  policy  of  residential  property  construction  on  a  large
scale. This was aimed at three major objectives: the provision of an adequate number of
apartments on the edge of the city; promotion of the buying of new housing; and the
decongestion of an overcrowded city centre. While these measures appear to aim at the
improvement of housing conditions (which were neglected during the first forty years
of the communist regime), the short-term objectives are more pragmatic. As is the case
with many others, this reform from on high is the result of the determination of the
state. For the municipality of Shanghai, the argument of modern conveniences plays
the role above all of an incitement. It serves to help economic growth, thanks to the
development of property promotion. It also provides a pretext for the renewal of the
physical  appearance  of  the  city.  Lastly,  it  contributes  to  the  maintenance  of  social
stability,  and  thus  participates  in  a  strategy  of  relegation  of the  individual  to  the
private sphere.
7 The reorganisation of Shanghai's  housing stock took place in three stages,  between
1992 and 20049.  During an initial  experimental stage, from 1992 to 1995, residential
property was partly privatised. This stage was marked by the chaotic construction of
new housing in the suburbs. The supply on offer, without any connection to the logic of
the market,  did not  correspond to real  demand,  and was not based on any proven
architectural model. Since these dwellings found no buyers, some were acquired by the
state, while others were demolished. The second stage (1996-2002) saw the spread of
the privatisation of the housing market. This stage was characterised by the regulation
of  construction and by the massive subdivision of  plots  available  in  the immediate
periphery. Moreover these new buildings, erected outside the inner circular highway,
Shanghai: Modern Conveniences as an Argument for Displacing Residents
China Perspectives, 58 | march - april 2005
3
were the object of various incentives to home ownership: the establishment of a system
of bank loans, standardisation of construction, special promotions, etc.
8 Beginning in 2003, buildable space became scarce inside the new perimeter of the city
centre (which was defined in 2000 by the outer circular highway). The emphasis then
shifted to the renovation of old housing within the historic centre, whose border is the
inner circular highway. Urban renewal offered new investment possibilities to property
developers. On the one hand, the local authorities wanted to finance the rehabilitation
of the housing stock inherited from the time of the Concessions and the Maoist period.
On the other hand, bringing the buildings up to standard would allow them to get rid of
housing which was unsaleable because of its decrepitude10. With the 2010 World Fair on
the horizon, the progress of the project had become urgent. This is a media event of
prime importance to Shanghai, whose ambition is to join the select club of globalised
metropolises.
9 From an official point of view, the standardisation of housing in Shanghai is evidence of
the general rise in the standard of living. On the ground, the directives of the state
translate into a huge commotion and an unprecedented social reconfiguration of urban
space. To oversimplify, they tended to disperse poverty in enclaves on the periphery
and to concentrate wealth in the heart of the city. Since 1990, 38 million square metres
of old buildings have been demolished in the ten central districts of the metropolis. At
the same time, over 800,000 families (2.7 million residents) were moved to the suburbs
between 1992 and 2001. Since the designation of the city, in 2002, as the site of the
World Fair, the work of the bulldozers has intensified. The renewal of the urban centre
is believed to have affected 98,750 households (around 340,000 residents) in 2002 and
79,000 (around 270,000 people) in 2003. As of October 1st 2004, the population affected
in the first nine months of the year was estimated at 9,500 households (about 33,000
residents)11.  Whatever the reliability of these official statistics,  evicted residents are
participating, against their will, in the gentrification of the city centre. The renovation
of these densely populated areas by demolition, or more rarely by renewal12 is the cause
of regular demonstrations of discontent. At a special meeting in June 2003, Hang Zhen,
the Mayor of Shanghai, is said to have stated that the proliferation of displacement
operations, by endangering social stability, were having a negative influence on the
development of the metropolis13.
10 In economic terms, the advantage of the evictions is nonetheless undeniable. According
to  Wang  Lianli,  their  continuation  is  even  essential.  In  fact,  these  mass  evictions
maintain the property bubble and thus sustain economic development14. Yet they also
put a strain on the legitimacy of the public authorities. At the local level, arbitration
between financial profits and civil interests is proving difficult. The international press
has given wide coverage to the excesses of property development everywhere in China.
Considering those displaced, it has emphasised the violation of residents' rights15. In
the face of pressure from the media, the Party's Central Committee approved, at the
end of 2003, a national directive forbidding forced evictions. This outline of a judicial
framework was reinforced, in March 2004, by inclusion in the Constitution of the right
to private property. But angry demonstrations by residents have not decreased16.
11 While the Shanghai press boasts of the success of “model housing operations”17,  the
national  press  is  debating the  adoption of  commercial  law as  the  judicial  basis  for
“displacement contracts”. Business publications uncover the misappropriation of funds
of  which  some  property  development  companies  have  been  guilty18.  However,  the
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validity  of  such  operations  is  not  called  into  question.  On  the  contrary,  they  are
credited with all sorts of advantages. The “moving” operations (WW, banqian) are said
to make it possible for the state to standardise the various forms of home ownership,
and to regain possession, “to the advantage of the majority”, of strategic spaces in the
city. They are also said to make it possible for low- or middle-income earners to become
property owners outside the marketplace, and to accede to modern conveniences in a
perimeter which is “close to the city centre”.
 
2. The relocation of the residents of Jianyeli
12 In practice, how are these evictions carried out nowadays? What are the reasons for the
dissatisfaction  of  the  displaced  city  dwellers?  In  what  terms  are  their  grievances
expressed? An analysis of Jianyeli, a historic district in the city centre in the course of
being  redeveloped,  makes  it  possible  to  put  forward  some  answers.  This  pilot
rehabilitation project, directed by the district of Xuhui, is being carried out with public
funds. While supposed to be in the public interest, the renewal of Jianyeli has become a
wrestling match between the local authorities and residents. The thorny problem of the
evictions lies at the heart of the disagreement.
The renovation of Jianyeli
13 Jianyeli is a lilong: a residential district, built between 1930 and 1938, at the heart of the
former French Concession in Shanghai. Made up of two- or three-storey semi-detached
houses,  it  was originally  designed to house 260 families.  In the course of  historical
events (Japanese occupation, civil war) its original residents temporarily sheltered new
arrivals who had come to seek refuge under the authority of the foreign powers. In
1956, the government requisitioned all private dwellings, which led to a redistribution
of  living  spaces.  During  the  Cultural  Revolution,  the  untimely  arrival  of  new
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occupants19, aggravated the splitting up of Jianyeli's housing. On January 1st 2003, the
population of the lilong was estimated at 3,000 residents divided into 1,050 homes20.
14 The authorities of Xuhui, the district of Shanghai responsible for Jianyeli, are carrying
out a policy of urban renewal, following the example of other sectors in the city centre.
In  this  context,  Jianyeli  enjoys  privileged  treatment.  Its  classification  in  the  list  of
districts to be preserved, as well as its inclusion inside a perimeter which is the object
of  a  conservation  plan,  has  allowed  it  to  avoid  demolition  and  to  benefit  from  a
restoration  project.  Officially,  the  operation  constitutes  a  priority  project  for  the
district of Xuhui. The district is seeking to establish a model for the renovation of the
historic areas of central Shanghai. The local authorities are concentrating their efforts
on three key areas: the financing of the renovation; the authenticity of the restoration;
and  the  management  of  the  original  population.  How  is  the  question  of  the
displacement of residents settled?
15 From a legal point of view, the eviction of the inhabitants of Jianyeli is based on two
regulations  published  by  the  Bureau  for  the  Management  of  Land  Resources  for
Residential Property of the City of Shanghai (Shanghai shi fangwu tudi ziyuan guanli
ju):  Directive  “111”  (dated  November  1st  2001)21 on  the  management  of  the
displacement  of  urban  residents,  and  another  directive  which  deals  with  the
preservation of the fabric of the historic areas of Shanghai22.
16 In August 2003, the Displacement Company of Xuhui, which has State Enterprise status
and is responsible for having the area evacuated, circulated by means of public
billboards, an initial notice aimed at the residents of Jianyeli23. This announcement was
followed by a practical information operation. The two regulations referred to were
distributed to  each household,  along with the  compensation each person would be
eligible for,  according  to  the  characteristics  of  their  lodging.  The  local  press  then
published several dossiers justifying, on the one hand, the necessity for the renovation
project and debating, on the other hand, the methods to be adopted in the restoration
of the built environment. The Displacement Company, for its part, refused to produce
the authorisation of the municipality officially approving the evictions. All demands for
justification of the legitimacy of the procedure being applied were also ignored. The
grounds  for  the  agreement  offered  to  the  residents  of  the  lilong  were  not  only
impenetrable,  they  were  also  not  open  to  discussion.  Moreover  the  terms  of  the
transaction were not to their advantage. It offered them modest lodgings in a faraway
suburb24 or  the payment of  financial  compensation,  which was deemed inadequate.
Nevertheless, 30% of the residents accepted the Displacement Company's offer, and left
within the specified deadline. The others did not move, despite a double reiteration of
the  eviction  order.  Jianyeli  then  became  the  scene  of  confrontations  between  the
district authorities,  represented by the Displacement Company, and the recalcitrant
residents, entrenched in their stronghold. The standoff continued until the end of 2003.
The deadline for the evictions was then extended to June 2004.
The resistance of the residents
17 At the beginning of August 2003, the district of Xuhui published a decree putting an
end to the residents’ right to use the lodgings in Jianyeli. This right had, originally,
been granted to the occupants on an indefinite basis. The residents of Jianyeli were
unable to become the owners of their lodgings for two reasons: firstly the division of
each housing unit would be between too many families, and secondly the decrepitude
of the buildings. The non-compliance of the lodgings with the new standards: lack of
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individual  bathrooms,  sharing of  kitchens,  inadequacy of  the drainage system,  etc.,
made the lodgings in Jianyeli unsaleable.
18 The decree published by the district of Xuhui gave formal notice of imminent eviction;
this took place on August 18th 2003.
19 The form and the amount of the compensation given to the occupants of Jianyeli for
evacuating the premises were at the entire discretion of the Displacement Company of
the district of Xuhui. The value of the buildings was fixed well below the going market
rate25. The Displacement Company did not, moreover, provide any measure of priority
in favour of the residents being able to return to the renovated lodgings. The lodgings
will  thus  be  available  to  the  former residents  at  the  same market  price  as  to  new
buyers… In answer to the pressing questions of the residents who hoped to be able to
move back into their homes, the Displacement Company skipped round the problem by
announcing a crippling sale price: five million yuan26, at the very least, per restored
house. The displacement compensation was of course far from equivalent to such a
sum. There was therefore no hope of being rehoused in the same place.
20 These conditions were not subject to preliminary consultation with the residents, nor
to arbitration with the help of independent experts. A month after the formal eviction
notice, the response of the majority of the residents to the authoritarian injunction to
leave, and to the inadequacy of the compensation, was a refusal to comply. Initially,
responsibility for this state of affairs did not fall on the municipality of Shanghai, but
on the Displacement Company of the district of Xuhui. According to the residents, the
Company took advantage of legal loopholes to impose its own interpretation of the law,
and thus benefit from the evictions. In the absence of any possibility of appealing, the
residents  began to negotiate,  case by case,  an agreement in their  favour.  Each was
confronted with a choice between three ways of resisting: “waiting for new and more
favourable offers” (W, deng); “leaving it to the state” (W, kao) to manage their material
difficulties;  or  “making  trouble”  (W,  nao)  by  taking  it  out  on  the  officials  of  the
Displacement Company.
21 In  the eyes  of  the authorities,  Jianyeli  amounts  to  no more than a  mere pocket  of
poverty  at  the  heart  of  a  strategic  area.  Keeping  it  in  its  existing  state  does  not
correspond to the policy of prestigious representation which the government intends
to  apply.  Nor  is  it  profitable  in  economic  terms:  the  powerful  Bureau  for  the
Management  of  Land Resources  for  Residential  Property  of  Xuhui  district  hopes  to
obtain a greater profit from such an under-exploited plot of land. Lastly the status quo
does not satisfy the residents themselves: the dilapidated state of the neighbourhood is
a source of endless complaints to local government. In short, for both administrators
and citizens the renewal of Jianyeli is as necessary as it is unavoidable. But on what
basis should it be carried out? From a practical point of view, taking into account the
demands  of  the  original  inhabitants  would  certainly  have  given  rise  to  problems
because of the density of the population. But other stakes were probably decisive in the
fate of the residents of the lilong. 
22 It  is  necessary  to  mention,  on  this  subject,  the  diverging  interests  of  the  various
administrative entities in charge of the dossier: the city planning bureaux at the city
level and of the district of Xuhui, on the one hand, and on the other the bureaux of land
management and their local client: the Residential Property Group of the district of
Xuhui  (Xuhuiqu  fangdiquan)27.  The  city  planners,  referring  to  the  master  plan  for
2000-2020, emphasise the necessity for preservation; the land managers, for their part,
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using as an argument the financial cost of such an approach, opt for the demolition of
Jianyeli and the construction of new buildings. The debate was not yet settled when the
evictions began, and in any case its outcome matters little to the co-ordinator of the
project, the director of the Xuhui district. As the one responsible for the carrying out of
the operation, his interests lie in swift completion of the work, on which his personal
political career depends. 
“Rooted households”28 versus the “hoodlum company”29
23 From June 2004, the Xuhui district Displacement Company is believed to have no longer
obtained any credit from the Construction Bank (Zhongguo jianshi yinghang). Whether
for lack of finance, or for other reasons, the process of displacement then came to a
halt. In the summer swelter the lodgings which were already demolished became nests
for rats and insects and an acrid smell of decay built up there. The status quo lasted
until the inspection, in September 2004, of the progress of the project by Sun Chao,
Mayor of the Xuhui district. The municipality decided to speed up the evictions. To this
end, it made more funds available. Despite these efforts, there still remained, at the
beginning  of  November  2004,  around  250  of  the  approximately  1,000  households
initially living in the lilong. 
24 The Displacement Company then implemented a new strategy. On November 25th it
brought in 200 migrant workers (mingong). These were not, however, workers such as
those  who,  having  come  with  their  families  in  March  2004,  were  working  on  the
demolition of the vacated dwellings (about 50 people). The new arrivals were specially
recruited to lay siege to the resisting residents. Divided into teams, each one directed
by a leader with a walkie-talkie,  they followed the movements and activities of the
inhabitants according to the orders of the Displacement Company. The population of
the  lilong  then  divided  into  three  groups:  the  recalcitrant  residents,  the  workers
carrying out the demolition, and the employees of the hoodlum company. The task of
the latter, who earn a good salary—50 yuan a day30—was for the time being to make the
residents' life impossible by frightening and mistreating them. A range of tactics were
used to dislodge the defenders.
25 The mingong received orders to take over all the spaces in the lilong: which is to say
the communal spaces and the empty houses, of course, but also the houses where some
dwellings were still occupied. This enabled the Displacement Company to carry out an
initial demonstration of strength: under its directives, the migrants broke down the
outside doors of the houses while their occupants were out. They then took over the
spaces initially occupied by former joint tenants who had already left.
26 In a second strike, the mingong every day, from 5am until 10pm, went up and down the
lilong,  equipped with loudspeakers  and whistles,  banging on doors,  etc.  On several
occasions the racket continued late into the night. The psychological pressure was also
adjusted to the situation of each household. An old person had broadcast, outside their
windows, the Buddhist prayers chanted during funeral rites. In front of a house where
there  was  a  new-born  baby,  the  migrants  howled  and  hammered  on  the  door  to
accompany its frightened cries. Residents who had broken off negotiations with the
employees of the Displacement Company were subjected to special treatment: a group
of “workers” would settle in front of their home to “play poker”, which is to say to
make a noise of course, but also to get in the way of the occupants' movements, and
possibly to get involved in verbal and physical battles with them. The group would
disperse  on  the  day  when  the  Displacement  Company  could  once  again  come  and
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present  its  offer;  it  would  immediately  gather  again  if  the  negotiations  were
unsuccessful.
27 Threats  and  intimidation  rapidly  bore  fruit:  by  mid-December  half  of  the  terrified
inhabitants  had  moved  out.  Around  a  hundred  households  accepted  the  new  and
improved  offers.  This  carrot  and  stick  policy  led  them  to  sign  the  displacement
contract  against  their  will  and  to  leave  the  location  as  quickly  as  possible.  By  the
middle of December 2004,  there remained the residents who were initially the best
housed and some diehards. None of them cited that they had the right to use their
dwelling, as a reason to remain, even though this is recognised as equivalent to a right
to the property, and which could not be taken from them by the renovation of the
building where their dwelling was. These entrenched residents refused to leave because
they felt they had not been justly treated, and were infuriated by the procedures, the
attitude  and  the  Ubuesque  discourse  of  the  representatives  of  the  Displacement
Company. They complained of the violation of human rights to which they were being
subjected,  but  did  not  demand  their  rights.  They  seemed  resigned  and  simply
demanded more “reasonable” (WW, heli) compensation for the despoilment of their
property.
28 These invincibles had to face new difficulties. The campaign of breaking and entering
occupied dwellings continued. It was then accompanied with devastation, plunder and
theft:  windows,  doors  and  locks  broken,  plumbing,  furniture  and  air-conditioners
damaged, bicycles, clothing, microwaves and washing-machines stolen, etc. These acts
of vandalism were preferably perpetrated while the occupants were absent,  but the
cover of night (with lighting cables having been cut) was sometimes sufficient to cover
the  thefts.  Significantly,  the  perpetrators  did  not  so  much  look  for  money  and
valuables,  as  for  anything  which  was  useful  in  everyday  life.  For  these  events  the
Displacement Company declined any responsibility. As for the police, they sympathised
with dumbfounded inhabitants or asked them to point out those responsible so that
they could arrest them!
29 The lilong had not been cleaned for a long time. The communal spaces and demolished
dwellings had become piles of rubbish. There was now added the excrement of the 200
migrant workers, which also served as projectiles thrown through windows and into
the courtyards. 
30 Serious  altercations  between  employees  of  the  Displacement  Company  and  the
residents, which ended in grievous bodily harm (broken ribs and jaws), numbered at
least half a dozen also took place from the beginning of the eviction process. While not
a daily occurrence, they were nonetheless the main reason for the discontent of the
residents and for explosions of collective anger. In November 2003, the residents of
Jianyeli had come together spontaneously and blocked the access to the headquarters
of Displacement Company, situated close to the lilong, after three residents had been
beaten up. On November 28th 2004, in the evening, they blocked the traffic again on
Jianguo Street leading to their lilong to protest the physical abuse of an elderly person
who had intervened in a dispute. That day, the crowd was only willing to disperse on
the arrival of the district Mayor in person. Five representatives volunteered then to
express the demands of the residents as a whole. They demanded that their physical
protection and the security of their possessions be assured, the immediate dismissal of
the  mingong,  and  the  opportunity  to  return  to  their  dwellings  at  the  end  of  the
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renovation procedure. The Mayor listened and offered reassuring words. But he did not
accede to the substance of their demands.
Modern conveniences under duress: adapting to circumstances or how to benefit from
fate?
31 Since the beginning of the eviction process at Jianyeli, numerous individual complaints
and  several  collective  petitions,  accusing  the  Xuhui  Displacement  Company  of
misappropriation of funds, were deposited at neighbourhood (jiedao), district and city
levels. None, however, has led to state intervention in favour of the plaintiffs. Why do
these demands not produce more responses? As the residents see it,  the scandalous
behaviour to which they are being subjected, is attributed to the lack of direct dialogue
between the leaders and the led. Lost in the maze of bureaucracy, their case arouses at
best indifference, and at worst a refusal to take it into consideration. Many residents
are disoriented, and Party members in particular feel betrayed: they no longer know
who to talk to, or who to trust. According to them, the power of the state is a “two-
faced  social  institution”  (bai  shehui,  hei  shehui),  concealing  an  organised  crime
operation  beneath  apparently  honourable  intentions.  The  regime  thus  places  itself
“above the law which it builds up while evading it” (quan ban fa, er bu shi fa ban quan).
It is using a “double-edged sword” (hei dao, bai dao)―invoking the legitimate power of
the law when the latter serves its own interests,  while resorting to illegal practices
when  its  objectives  are  threatened.  Why  did  the  residents  of  Jianyeli  insist  on
recognition of a right which, quite obviously, does not apply to their case? They saw no
point in referring to and following the law, but were also divided as to how to respond
in the face of the acts of the Displacement Company.
32 Beyond the general feeling of revolt, the last residents of the lilong had difficulty in
formulating  common  demands.  Having  had  their  fingers  burned  in  the  successive
waves of repression since the birth of the People's Republic, they were distrustful of
any form of organised demand. While the oldest describe the situation in terms of the
terror they felt under the Japanese occupation, the middle-aged recall the atmosphere
of suspicion that prevailed during the Cultural Revolution. From the memories of the
denunciations, they have learned the following lesson: trust nobody, keep the interests
of  the family circle foremost,  and do not worry about the fate of  others.  From the
trauma of the repression of 1989 there persists a disillusionment about protest. Public
action in broad daylight not only seems derisory to them, it is above all considered
dangerous. Such a perception was maintained, for example, by the rumours during the
Zhou  Zhengyi  case31.  This  fear,  whether  justified  or  groundless,  is  deliberately
exploited. 
33 At the same time, access to modern conveniences, presented as a unique opportunity
offered by rehousing in the suburbs, serves as bait. As members of the underclass, the
ordinary people, (laobaixing), that is to say “without power, money or support” (wu
quan, wu qian, wu guanxi), the residents of Jianyeli were resigned, since the economic
reforms, to counting for very little. The displacements offered them an opportunity to
enjoy  benefits  which  were  much  more  attractive,  in  the  short  term,  than  the
recognition of their rights. The residents would willingly have shown disdain for any
claims to justice or legality, and would have contented themselves with their fate, if
they had not had the feeling of being subjected to treatment that was “unequal” (bu
gongping), or even “contrary to good sense” (bu jiang daoli), and in fact “unfavourable”
(bu  hesuan).  All  in  all,  the  more  the  financial  compensation  is  deemed  to  be
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insufficient,  the  more  unjust  the  logic  of  the  evictions  seems  to  the  residents.
Moreover, because of the ill-treatment inflicted on them, it was no longer possible for
them to stick imperturbably to their positions.
34 The success of their demands could depend both on their clear-sightedness and their
capacity for endurance. They have two weapons at their disposal with which to defend
themselves  completely  legally:  time  and  an  appeal  to  the  Complaints  Bureau
(shangfang).  Time is against the government, since the lack of return is excessively
expensive for the financial players. Thus in Shanghai the obstinate refusal of a single
resident is said to have frustrated more than one urban renewal programme, whether
commercial  or  in  the  public  interest.  Hence  the  necessity  for  the  state  to  show
consideration  for  the  interests  of  all.  The  appeals  procedure  makes  it  possible  to
denounce  the  illegal  practices  to  which  citizens  can  be  subjected.  Setting  the
administrative  machinery  in  motion,  it  can  play  on  the  conflicting  political  stakes
within the Party. In this case, the directives of the central state aimed at preserving
social  stability  may  also  have  the  purpose  of  reining  in  the  excesses  of  property
development.
35 In the face of the “incivility” (bu wenming) of the procedures used by the Displacement
Company, some Jianyeli residents therefore attempted an “appeal” to Peking. A group
of about ten households came together on December 19th 2004 to send an emissary to
carry their complaints to the capital.  By doing this,  they hoped to obtain from the
Ministry of Construction the opening of an enquiry into their case, and thus to bring
pressure to bear on the Displacement Company. Their representative left on December
20th  2004  to  deliver  a  dossier  to  the  Complaints  Bureau  of  the  State  Council
(guowuyuan xinfang bangongshi).  The complaint was not accepted. Since it had not
been the object of a preliminary appeal to the courts, it could not be examined. The
messenger was advised, however, to go to the Ministry of Construction and explain the
complaint. The crimes related did not unfortunately seem to move the employees of
the  department  concerned.  They  concluded  that  “there  is  nothing  to  get  alarmed
about” (mei you shizixing de wenti). In other words, there was no crime sufficiently
sensational to justify an enquiry in Jianyeli…
36 Was  this  a  failure?  For  half  of  those  who  signed  the  appeal,  negotiations  were
successfully concluded within ten days of their action, without any link between cause
and  effect  to  connect  the  two  events.  Compensation  of  a  few  hundred  yuan32 was
allowed them for the thefts committed by the migrants. The other half did not wait for
the effects of the complaint either. Some residents opted for a strategy of “moving by
escape” (duoban)33 and left their dwellings without receiving any compensation, in the
hope of being able to negotiate later in exchange for their co-operation. Others decided
to stake all by refusing to let themselves be intimidated, or by staying on the defensive
night and day to protect their property. In the lilong, some residents have been using
parallel strategies: one family appealed to an influential relative who lives in the United
States, another boasts of having recourse to the services of a secret society (hei shehui).
37 The deadline for the eviction procedure, which was to expire on December 31st 2004,
was once again postponed for three months. The number of migrants was halved. The
real demolition work began34. On January 5th 2005, however, acts of vandalism—break-
ins,  burglaries,  the  wrecking  of  private  dwellings—began  with  renewed  intensity.
According to the employees of the Displacement Company, there remained at that time,
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around  a  hundred  households  in  Jianyeli  whose  “problems  would  very  soon  be
resolved”35.
Pressure without repression: the definition of the implicit rules of the game
38 In sum, Jianyeli, as the object of a pilot urban renewal project, allows the district of
Xuhui to test new methods for three areas of the renovation of the historic centre of
Shanghai. Firstly the financing is controlled by the local authorities; for this reason the
evacuation of the site is carried out with public funds without the external intervention
of a property development company. Secondly the renovation of the buildings has to
conform with  its  use  as  housing,  as  the  original  construction.  Thirdly,  the  project,
which uses as a pretext the improvement of housing conditions, claims to proceed from
a balance between the power of the state and the interests of the population…
39 However Jianyeli, as is the case for most residential sectors undergoing renovation, has
become  the  scene  and  has  the  stakes  of  an  ordinary  power  struggle.  Some  of  the
objectives of the operation, whether they be the enhancement of the district of Xuhui,
the recognition of the personal merit of its director, or the quest for profits for the
local authorities, are at the root of the problem. The latter lies in the combination by
the  authorities  of  two  incompatible  roles:  those  of  administrator  and  of  economic
player. The residents' dispute stems from the sale of dwellings which are extremely
well situated, of which the municipality has become the owner only by the hazards of
history. They are not taken in, they know that the dwellings they occupied, in some
cases for several generations, will be resold for a fortune. For the local government it is
difficult to be both judge and jury without breaking the law, which is to say without
adapting the municipal regulations to its own convenience and without skirting around
the  directives  of  the  central  government.  It  is  thus  the  methods  of  re-establishing
control  inherited from the  Maoist  period which are  used to  settle  differences.  The
Displacement  Company,  to  which  the  district  of  Xuhui  has  delegated  the  problem,
believes that only the fear of punishment can weaken the will of the inhabitants to
continue to resist their displacement. It therefore tries to find ways to put pressure on
the residents,  knowing that it  can count neither on the army nor on the police for
assistance. The mingong, deliberately set against the recalcitrants, are here given a new
role.  The  Displacement  Company  provides  them  with  an  opportunity  to  take  their
frustrations out on city dwellers, who usually despise them. It also has in them a classic
scapegoat who can be blamed for all the damage done.
40 Moreover, the outcome of the negotiation process shows how, by coming to terms with
a displacement project  which is  imposed on them, the majority  of  the residents  of
Jianyeli  consider  that  they  are  benefiting  from  the  situation  by  acceding  to  more
modern  conveniences.  In  reality,  they  are  exchanging  the  increasingly  coveted
privilege of living in the centre of the city for a benefit which is not necessarily within
their  grasp:  that  of  having as  many separate  lodgings  as  there are  households  per
family. That also explains why some dissatisfied households, having been pushed into a
corner, resort to organising themselves temporarily in order to defend their common
interests.
How have the rules of the game changed?
41 In Shanghai, the move of the residential property sector into the market economy is
taking place within the context of a chronic housing shortage. The radical change in
the  rules  of  access  to  housing,  marked  by  the  abandonment  of  the  old  system,  is
coupled with an improvement in standards of domestic comfort. Many urban dwellers,
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however, have neither the desire nor the means to pay the price of such a process. The
consequences are numerous and significant. Residential space is being redistributed in
accordance with a new social segregation. Three objectives are being pursued by the
housing  reorganisation  policy.  First  of  all  it  is  a  case  of  sustaining  economic
development, secondly of promoting the renewal of the physical appearance of the city,
and finally of perpetuating social stability. On this last point, the financial investment
represented by housing, as well as the enjoyment of better housing conditions, should,
according to Chinese leaders,  contribute to relegating social  demands to within the
boundaries  of  the  private  sphere.  The  implementation of  these  different  objectives
gives rise, however, to two major types of protest: the first concerns the privatisation
of the management of new housing which is put on the market. The second concerns
the  policy  of  renovation  of  old  housing.  The  example  of  Jianyeli  thus  illustrates  a
struggle for “urban dominance” (the physical and symbolic takeover of urban space, to
the benefit of those who really hold power)36 linked to the question of the wholesale
displacement of the residents of the centre of the city.
42 As the referees in an unequal struggle, the Shanghai authorities are facing a strategic
challenge.  With  the  aim  of  stimulating  the  building  sector  and  of  financing  the
renovation of old housing, they are making a bet on favouring the financial players,
while  trying  to  show  consideration  for the  interests  of  the  residents.  Despite  the
increasing inequality in access to housing, the desire of both the central government
and the local authorities to avoid confrontation increases the margin for individual
manœuvre. This does not, however, mean that such confrontation does not take place.
It is becoming a means of negotiation which is risky, but can prove to be advantageous
both  to  the  representatives  of  the  municipality  and  to  the  residents.  In  fact,  the
residents  involved  in  a  displacement  project  rarely  have  the  means  of  attaining
ownership of a new dwelling by way of the market. The displacements are therefore
accepted if  the  conditions  of  their  application are  negotiated.  Individual  control  of
one's own destiny and that of one's family comes before the construction of an ideal of
equity  applicable  to  all.  Satisfaction  or  vexation  are  in  fact  relative  to  subjective
improvement in each particular case, assessed in the light of the course of one specific
life.
43 From the  government's  point  of  view,  the  negotiations  should  make  it  possible  to
restrain  the  demands  of  dissatisfied  residents.  These  circumstantial  agreements,
concluded at great expense, are aimed at maintaining social peace. If the ruled have the
possibility of demanding, on an individual basis, the granting of wider privileges, the
recalcitrants  are  unlikely  to  organise.  The  constitution  of  civil  society  remains
constrained in that respect. Moreover, this social compromise constitutes a dilemma
for local government in several respects. How can they keep alive the feeling that daily
life is being constantly improved? How can they raise the financing needed to continue
the renovation of the residential housing stock? Also, how can they offer attractive
deals to foreign investors while working on drawing up a legal framework for urban
development? The displacements of city-dwellers, which make it possible to strike an
ad hoc balance between economic interests and the interests of the population, may be
the  answer.  This  would  consist  of  protecting  the  power  of  the  state  from political
protest, by negotiating, with an atomised society, the granting of specific benefits. 
44 Translated from the French original by Michael Black
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1. Cf Valérie Laurans, “Housing and comfort in Shanghai. The example of the Wanli
model residential complex”, China Perspectives, No. 39, January-February 2002, pp.
36-44.
2. See Valérie Laurans, “Shanghai dans le champ des études urbaines. Un aperçu de la
recherche shanghaienne sur la ville au tournant du XXIe siècle” (Shanghai in the field
of urban studies. An overview of Shanghai research on the city at the dawn of the
twenty-first century), a study commissioned by the French Human and Social Sciences
Agency in Peking, www.antenne-pekin.com.
3. “In fact, we are not at all used to being considered city dwellers […], even in the
heart of the city where we live, we count as mere residents. […] beyond the commercial
market, and its own particular economic organisation and legal institutions, a real city
is also characterized by the emergence of an autonomous civil society”. Chen Yingfang, 
Shimin yu chengshi shehui (City dwellers and urban society), Dangdai wenhua yanjiu wang
(Contemporary culture research network), www.cul-studies.com, 20th December 2004.
4. Bao Yaming, Youdangzhi de quanli. Xiaofei shihui yu dushi wenhua yanjiu (The Rights of a
Flâneur. Consumer Society and Urban Cultural Studies), Zhongguo dangdai xueshu sixian
wenku (Contemporary Chinese Scientific Thought Series), Zhonguo renmin daxue
chubanshe, Peking, 2004, 276 p. After Bars in Shanghai (2001), The Rights of a Flâneur
describes the process of cultural and social standardisation to which commercial logic
reduces the public spaces of the metropolis.
5. Li Youmei, Director of the Sociology Department of Shanghai University, has
researched the structural reform of the urban administration of Shanghai and into the
management of new residential communities.
6. Wang Kun, a doctoral candidate at the Institute of Political Studies (Sciences Po) in
Paris, is studying the privatisation of the management of residential complexes under
the direction of Professor Erhard Friedberg.
7. Benjamin L. Read, “Democratizing the Neighbourhood New Private Housing and
Home-owner Self-organization in Urban China”, in The China Journal, No. 49, January
2003, pp. 31-59.
8. Zhu Jiangang, Guo yu jia zhijian: Shanghai lingli de shimin tuanti yu shiqu yundong de
minzhu zhi (Between the Family and the State. An Ethnography of the Civil Associations and
Community Movements in a Shanghai lilong Neighborhood), doctoral thesis in anthropology,
under the direction of Professor Joseph Bosco, Chinese University of Hong Kong, July
2002, 250 p.
9. For more details of the massive construction of new housing in Shanghai, see Valérie
Laurans, “Housing and Comfort in Shanghai”, op. cit.
10. Bringing decrepit housing up to standard consists mainly of lowering its
occupational density, renovating the wiring and plumbing, providing each apartment
with its own kitchen and bathroom, etc.
11. According to the guidelines of the overall plan for 2000-2020, the population of the
ten central districts of Shanghai is to be kept at around eight million. 
12. Since 1999, two pockets of housing have been the object of renewal operations. Each
has been accompanied by the displacement of the entire original population: Xintiandi,
a district of Luwan, and Jianyeli, a district of Xuhui.
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13. Liu Ju, “Dongqian weisha zheyang nan ?”, Xin zhuzhai shidian, (Why do the
displacements cause so many problems?), New home vision, January 24th 2005, Internet
version, http://www.newhouse.chinanews.com.cn
14. Wang Lianli, “Dongqian maodun shi bu pingdeng jiaoyi chansheng de jiegou” (The
contradictions of the displacements are the result of unfair transactions), Beijing dajun
jingji guancha yanjiu zhongxin (Dajun Center for Economics Watch and Studies), Peking,
March 16th 2004, and “Shanghai wei chengshi gaizao suo fuchu de daijia” (The cost of
urban renewal in Shanghai), Beijing dajun jingji guancha yanjiu zhongxin, Peking, March
15th 2004, available at www.dajun.com.cn
15. For an example in the French press, see Philippe Pataud-Célérier, “La Chine
en mutation, Shanghaï sans toits ni lois” (Changing China, Homeless
and Lawless Shanghai) , Le Monde diplomatique, March 2004.
16. Residential displacements come before redundancies as the cause of complaints
lodged with the central government. See Liu Ju, “Dongqian weisha zheyang nan ?”, op. cit. 
17. On the subject of a displacement operation carried out in the district of Yangpu, the
Shanghai evening daily Xinmin wanbao headlined on the December 19th 2004:
“Displaced residents queue up to sign up” (WWWWWWWW, dongqian jumin paidui
qianyue). On the January 9th, the same daily gave a highly evasive account of a fire
which had occurred in a lilong under demolition in the district of Xuhui. Of criminal
origin according to neighbours, the incident caused the deaths of two residents who
were refusing to leave.
18. See Xie Guanfei, “Bu shi ‘buchong anzhi’ er shi ‘jiaozheng caichan guanxi‘” (Not
‘compensating for the dispersements’ but ‘adjusting the exchanges of property’) 
Zhongguo jingji shibao (China Economic Times), August 27th 2003. Ren Bo, “Chaiqian zhi su”
(News of the dispersements), Caijing, No. 87, July 5th 2003.
19. At the beginning of the Cultural Revolution, one or several of the rooms of
dwellings in Jianyeli which housed a single household were requisitioned by the local
Housing Management Bureau (WWW, fang guan suo). These requisitions were aimed at
punishing the “enemy classes” and made it possible to house the homeless of the
district.
20. Xuhui bao, Jianyeli gaizao baohu zhuankan (Xuhui Journal, special edition on the
renovation of Jianyeli), August 18th 2003. The figures provided by the Jianyeli
residents' committee, calculated on the number of hukou registered in the lilong (which
is to say not counting temporary residents such as the migrants) are different: they
count 4,300 residents in 1,455 households. Calculated in the mid-1990s, these figures do
not show the decongestion of the lilong which followed the liberalisation of access to
housing. Here I call “home” a group of people who are related and occupy the same
dwelling. The latter shelters in the same space several generations or several related
members of a family who wish to separate into different “households”.
21. Bureau for the Management of Land Resources for Residential Property of the City
of Shanghai, Shanghai shi chengshi fangwu chaiqian shishi xize, 2001/10/1 (Management of
the displacement of urban residents of the city of Shanghai. Detailed regulations of
application, October 1st 2001). 
22. Bureau for the Management of Land Resources for Residential Property of the City
of Shanghai, Shanghai shi lishi wenhua fengmao qu he youxiu lishi jianzhu baohu tiaoli, 
Shanghai shi fangwu tudi ziyuan guanli ju, 2002/11 (Regulation for the preservation of
sectors of historic and cultural character and of the eminent historical architecture of
the city of Shanghai, November 2002).
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23. Between August and November 2003, the period corresponding to the beginning of
the evacuation of the lilong, three public notices (WW, tonggao) were drawn up by Xuhui
Displacement Company, aimed at the residents of Jianyeli.
24. See the map showing the location of rehousing complexes.
25. The average compensation was initally calculated on the basis of 4,700 yuan (470
euros) per square metre of habitable space. The market price for “buying out” the right
to use a similar dwelling (a private transaction accepted by the Residential Property
Managment Bureau) is between 12,000 and 15,000 yuan (1,200 to 1,500 euros) per
square metre.
26. 500,000 euros.
27. This is a state enterprise entrusted, after the administrative reform of the city, with
the management of the public housing stock which was formerly attributed to the
various “Housing Management Bureaux” (WWW, fangguan suo) of the district of Xuhui.
As such, it is entrusted with the “restoration” (i.e. demolition followed by the
reconstruction of similar buildings) of dwellings which are listed as historic buildings
of the city.
28. WWW, dingzi hu: popular parlance for those households most determined to resist a
displacement directive. 
29. WWWW, liumang gongsi: a term used by residents for the displacement companies.
30. 5 euros.
31. A Shanghai property magnate who was arrested following the accusations of Zheng
Enchong, a lawyer who represented the interests of residents who had been evicted
without compensation. The leaders of the protest movement, and then Zheng Enchong
himself, were arrested. The latter was imprisoned for divulging state secrets to an NGO:
Amnesty International. The case received a lot of coverage in the Chinese and
international press. See in particular Lin Huawei, “Zhou Zhengyi xingshuai” (The rise and
fall of Zhou Zhengyi), Caijing, No. 86, June 20th 2003.
32. A few tens of euros.
33. Following the maxim “In the face of a battle that is sure to be lost, victory lies in
flight” (re bu qi, duo de qi).
34. The administration entrusted with the dossier finally opted for a “restoration”
project which called for the demolition of most of the original buildings.
35. “There are about a hundred families still (in Jianyeli). They are all experiencing
difficulties, but these will very soon be resolved”. (Xianzai [zai Jianyeli] hai you 100 dou hu.
Tamen dou shi you kunnan de, danshi wenti hen kuai jiu hui jiejue).
36. See Henri Lefebvre, La Production de l’espace (The Production of Space), Anthropos,
Paris, 2000.
RÉSUMÉS
This article focuses on the means of attaining modern conveniences in housing in Shanghai at
the beginning of the twentieth century. More precisely, it examines the social consequences of
the state's lack of investment in the housing sector. Does the evolution of property legislation
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call  state  domination  into  question?  How much influence  does  the  mobilisation  of  property
legislation have in terms of  the accession to material  benefits?  A detailed study of  the pilot
rehabilitation  project  which  the  historic  area  of  Jianyeli  is  undergoing  makes  it  possible  to
understand the role played by modern conveniences in the displacement of urban residents in
Shanghai.
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